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In sixteenth-century Nîmes, September 29, or Michaelmas, marked the
start of the biggest fair of the year, and the town was filled with excite-
ment, people, and activity. On Michaelmas 1567 the celebrations took
a sinister turn, in what became the best-known, and darkest, date in the
town’s annals. On September 30, in an event that because of its tim-
ing became known as the Michelade, members of the town’s Protestant
majority, led by many members of Nîmes’s présidial court, rose up and
overthrew the Catholic town council. Nîmes’s Catholics were unlucky
enough to have a traitor within their ranks, Pierre Suau, called Captain
Bolhargues, who led the town’s troops before switching to the Protes-
tant side. The Protestants first went looking for the town’s first consul,
Guy de Rochette, who carried the keys to the town’s gates, and then
seized him, the keys, and the gates. Crying ‘‘Kill, kill the papists,’’ they
arrested many leading Catholics, laymen and priests; imprisoned them
in a room used for killing animals; and then, according to contempo-
rary estimates, massacred one hundred of them in cold blood, includ-
ing Rochette. About one-third of the dead can be securely identified.1
Once in power, Protestants remade the town’s sacred geography, while
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at the same time they attempted to secure their position by seizing the
royal château located at the northeastern corner of the town walls.
The Michelade is significant for several reasons. First, it was large
even in an era of religious massacres: if the estimated death toll is cor-
rect, the Michelade was nearly as bloody as the Saint Bartholomew’s
Massacre of 1572, taking into account the relative populations of Nîmes
and Paris.2 Protestants in Nîmes even perpetrated a second, compa-
rably sized massacre in 1569. Second, the Michelade is remarkably well
documented. For most massacres during the Wars of Religion we pos-
sess only secondhand printed accounts, but for the Michelade we have
depositions from actual witnesses. Third, the Michelade was unusual
in that it involved a Protestant majority attacking a Catholic minority.
Since Catholics were usually more numerous and more powerful in
sixteenth-century France, the Michelade offers an unusual opportu-
nity to look at how Protestants behaved when they were not restrained
by their minority status. The standard scholarly interpretation—com-
monly associated with Natalie Z. Davis—argues that sixteenth-century
French Protestants were less violent or practiced different forms of
violence than Catholics. The case of the Michelade suggests this view
needs to be significantly modified. Not only were the Michelade and the
Saint Bartholomew’s Massacre similar in relative size, their perpetrators
pursued similar methods and goals. Protestants in sixteenth-century
Nîmes behaved much like their Catholic compatriots.
The Michelade occupies a peculiar place in the historiography
of the French Wars of Religion. On the one hand, it is well known,
mentioned in most standard surveys. On the other hand, no histo-
rian devoted more than a paragraph of analysis to it for well over
two centuries, until in 2000 Joshua Millet devoted a major portion of
his doctoral dissertation to it.3 The consensus of historians appears to
be that the Michelade was the single exception that proves the rule:
in sixteenth-century France, Catholics massacred Protestants. Thus,
because the Michelade was an anomaly, it does not need an explana-
tion. Instead, we need to understand Catholics’ motivations to commit
2 In Paris, between 2,000 and 4,000 people died in the Saint Bartholomew’s Massacre, out
of a population of 250,000–300,000 (the figures for the massacre are from Arlette Jouanna, La
France du XVIe siècle [Paris, 1996], 472; for the population of Paris, cf. ibid., 33, and Philip Benedict,
ed., Cities and Social Change in Early Modern France [London, 1989], 9), while Nîmes had a popula-
tion of 10,000–12,000; if the midpoints of the ranges are used, 1.1% of the population died in the
Saint Bartholomew’s, compared to 0.9% in the Michelade.
3 See, e.g., R. J. Knecht, The Rise and Fall of Renaissance France (London, 1996), 397–98.There
is one long paragraph in Janine Garrisson-Estèbe, Protestants du Midi, 1559–1598 (Toulouse, 1980),
165–66; the dissertation is Joshua E. Millet, ‘‘A City Converted: The Protestant Reformation at
Nîmes, 1532–67’’ (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2000). I would like to thank Millet for lending
me a copy of his dissertation to read.
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violence elsewhere and the elements of French Protestant ideology that
restrained them from such behavior. Denis Crouzet, the author of the
most extensive study of religious violence in the period, insists that
there was not, in the beginning and before a perversion that issued
naturally from the rituals of war, a Protestant practice of massacre
(the celebrated Michelade of Nîmes is a separate case) because the
Millennium was dawning for the Protestant party in these crucial
years, in the course of which they were engaged with all their being
in a war glorifying at every instant the infinite greatness of God. . . .
[Protestant] thought is thus optimistic, perhaps utopian, rooted in
the power of the Truth finally restored to men, a thought which con-
ceived of a ‘‘soft’’ reconstruction of humanity under the Reign of
Christ, without breaking bodies and without torturing flesh.4
Crouzet argues that theology alone drove Protestant behavior: Protes-
tants did not massacre Catholics because, at least at first, there was no
cultural or intellectual logic leading them to do so, not because they
did so desire but because they lacked the ability. (Crouzet does admit
that over time, as Catholic massacres accumulated, Protestants began
to desire revenge and this ‘‘perversion’’ led them to respond in kind.)
In this he is following the arguments of Davis, who inaugurated the
modern study of sixteenth-century French religious violence, but her
arguments were more cautious and nuanced. She concludes that
the iconoclastic Calvinist crowds still come off as the champions
in the destruction of religious property. . . . This was not only be-
cause the Catholics had more physical accessories to their rite, but
also because the Protestants sensed much more danger and defile-
ment in the wrongful use of material objects. . . . In bloodshed, the
Catholics are the champions. . . . I think this is owing not only to
their being in the long run the stronger party numerically in most
cities, but also to their having a greater sense of the persons of heretics
as sources of danger and defilement. Thus, injury and murder were
a preferred mode of purifying the body social.5
Davis carefully notes that Protestants were less violent than Catholics
for religious reasons in addition to their weakness, but she does not
attempt to discover which factor was the more important one. This
article argues that the only way to conclude whether weakness or ideol-
ogy was the predominant cause of French Protestant behavior is to look
at the few places like Nîmes where Protestants were dominant. If Protes-
4 Denis Crouzet, Les guerriers de dieu, 2 vols. (Paris, 1991), 1:600–601.
5 Natalie Z. Davis, ‘‘The Rites of Violence,’’ in Society and Culture in Early Modern France (Stan-
ford, CA, 1975), 173–74. Davis’s greater attention to social history is hardly surprising, since (as
she acknowledges) she was inspired to work on crowd violence by reading E. P. Thompson and
George Rudé.
4 FRENCH HISTORICAL STUDIES
tants were reluctant to shed blood when they held power in Nîmes, it
would be powerful evidence that religious ideology was a more impor-
tant cause of religious massacres than sociology and power.
The surviving sources for the Michelade are unusually rich. They
consist almost entirely of thirty firsthand accounts by the victims, in the
form of affidavits that were collected by agents of the Parlement of Tou-
louse who were sent to organize the prosecution of the perpetrators.
Their style is disjointed, going from one anecdote to the next, which
suggests that their written form is quite close to their original oral deliv-
ery.They are also fairly circumspect, frequently admitting that they can-
not remember all of the people present, adding sometimes that they
would ‘‘remember them if they saw them again.’’6 To learn as much as
possible about the witnesses, the participants, and the victims of the
massacre, I have also used the records of the town council and the Prot-
estant consistory and a database I compiled of all wills and marriage
contracts that survive for Nîmes from the period 1550–62 (Old Style),
which give very rich data on most men’s occupations, wealth, and so
forth. This extensive source material contrasts very favorably with the
usual printed accounts, in which we often cannot even tell the source of
the authors’ information, and in which it is easy to imagine how rumor
inflated reality. In comparison, it is possible to learn a great deal about
the participants in the Michelade, which can aid us substantially when
we try to understand their actions. For the Michelade, it is possible not
only to analyze the discourse used by the participants but also to inves-
tigate the people creating it.
The Origins of the Reformation in Nîmes
Nîmes in the sixteenth century was a town of about ten thousand people
and an important settlement in the region of Bas-Languedoc. It was
the seat of a bishopric; the bishop in the 1560s was Bernard d’Elbène.
Nîmes’s château had a small garrison of royal troops, led by Captain La
Garde. A municipal militia led by Captain Bolhargues was in charge of
patrolling the streets. Bolhargues had fought valiantly for the Protes-
tant cause, but Nîmes’s Catholic leaders were equally happy to employ
him—indeed, he was friends with several.7 Much of the population
6 About half of the surviving depositions have been printed in Ménard 5, Preuves, 24–
65, while the rest can be found in the Archives Départementales du Gard (hereafter ADG),
G442. Crouzet, Guerriers de dieu, 1:48, argues that ‘‘il fallait, soit tout accepter des violences
dont s’accusent, voire s’auto-accusent les protagonistes, soit tout refuser,’’ but this position seems
extreme to me.
7 Many writers, including Ménard, normalize the name to Bouillargues. Bolhargues’s reli-
gion is unclear and is discussed in more detail later. Several members of his family were Protes-
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worked the fields outside of town; a large percentage of the population
was also occupied in transforming wool and hides, the products of the
Cévennes mountains, northwest of town, into cloth and leather. Nîmes
was also already famous for its Roman antiquities. The most important
people in Nîmes, however, earned their living and derived their pres-
tige from the government offices they held and from the lands they had
bought. In 1552 King Henri II had awarded Nîmes a présidial court,
which was grafted onto the town’s existing sénéchaussée. The judges of
the présidial court were the most prestigious people in town, and on
the basis of the dowries in their marriage contracts (on average, about
twelve hundred livres tournois), the richest. The court enjoyed a wide
jurisdiction, and the steady flow of litigation produced a great deal of
revenue: in effect, the judicial business was a mainstay of the local econ-
omy. It is not surprising therefore that the town’s constitution reserved
the most powerful position in local government, the post of first con-
sul, to a lawyer. Among Nîmes’s professions, lawyers had the second-
highest dowries at slightly more than 900 livres, well above those of
merchants (259 livres), bourgeois (456 livres), doctors (633 livres), and
other professionals and artisans.8 Nîmes’s three other consulships were
also reserved for specific occupational groups, which gives some idea
of the hierarchy of prestige among them: the second consul had to be
a merchant or bourgeois, the third consul an artisan or notary, and the
fourth consul a laboureur (a wealthy farmer). The four consuls were the
leaders of the town council. These two institutions, the présidial court
and the town council, were key to maintaining local public order. The
judges served for life, sometimes resigning in favor of younger relatives.
The members of the town council served for a year, but they were not
elected. Instead, the sitting members selected four candidates for each
of the four consular positions, and the winner was then selected by lot.
tants, however. Mathieu Suau was a canon and, starting in the late 1540s, the bishop’s deputy,
while Jean Suau was an archdeacon (Albert Puech, ‘‘Les débuts de la Réforme à Nîmes, d’après des
documents inédits,’’ in La Renaissance et la Réforme à Nîmes [Nîmes, 1893], 45, 180). Either Mathieu
or Jean appears to have converted to Protestantism, since on Mar. 27, 1562 a Monsieur Suau was
called before the consistory to explain why he did not resign his benefices. He explained that he
needed the money, and he had to pay for the Protestant minister out of the revenues. He added
that he had also given one of the benefices to his cousin, ‘‘cappitaine Boulhargues.’’ See Registres
du consistoire de l’église de Nîmes (hereafter CR), fol. 103. The original of CR is now held in Paris, BN
Mss. Français 8666, 8668, 8669.There are also two transcriptions available in Nîmes. ADG, 42 J 26,
formerly Archives of the Eglise Reformée de Nîmes B-90/1, was made in 1874 by Louis Auzière.
It preserves the original foliation. A second copy by Auzière is still in the church archives, B-91; it
is paginated differently but notes the original folio numbers in the margins. It is useful because it
has an index.
8 On lawyers in Nîmes, see Albert Puech, Une ville au temps jadis, ou Nîmes à la fin du XVIe siècle
(Nîmes, 1884), 17, 119. For average dowries, see Allan A. Tulchin, ‘‘The Reformation in Nîmes’’
(PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2000), 413–14.
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(Some of the elections turned out very conveniently. The lottery may
have been rigged.) The new consuls and the old consuls then chose
the new members of the council. Thus Nîmes’s citizens had no right to
vote for the town’s leadership, although ordinary citizens could speak
at council meetings. The self-perpetuating elite that governed through
the consuls was nonetheless responsive to popular needs: its members
were prepared, for example, to dip into their own pockets when faced
with harvest shortfalls and high grain prices. Their attitude might best
be described as deeply paternalistic.
In Nîmes, the years 1557–60 were particularly bad: there was a
nearly catastrophic flood in 1557, and the grain harvest failed in all
four years. The town’s elite was extremely concerned by the crisis and
attempted to remedy it as best they could given the limited means avail-
able. They were prepared to borrow considerable sums and to spend
their own money to purchase grain for the town. They also attempted
to restrict food prices by law, which led to a hostile relationship with
members of most of the food trades. But influential members of the
town council were frustrated. They faced a tremendous task in trying
to keep the town on an even keel in terrible economic times, while the
crown, instead of assisting them, imposed numerous heavy and illegal
fiscal burdens—taxes, forced loans, and bribes—to support its unsuc-
cessful foreign policy. Sensing that the town’s hard times had created a
better climate for recruiting members, in 1559 the Company of Pastors
in Geneva sent Nîmes its first permanent pastor, Guillaume Mauget.
He arrived in late September, and a tumultuous period of mass meet-
ings began in the spring of 1560. Although Nîmes’s présidial, as yet rela-
tively uninfected by heresy, acted with considerable energy to repress
the disorders, the Protestant movement gained support by arguing that
the kingdom’s problems stemmed from a pervasive moral degeneration
and that Nîmes needed a church governance vested in local leadership.
Furthermore, money should be diverted from useless masses and cere-
monies to poor relief. Nîmes’s leadership, hitherto resistant to Prot-
estantism, found these arguments powerfully persuasive because they
provided a convincing narrative that explained how Nîmes’s problems
had developed and how to solve them. As a result, the governing elites
associated with the town council began to convert—Protestant recruit-
ment figures make it clear that between 1560 and early 1561 the move-
ment was particularly successful in attracting lawyers, notaries, and
other legal professionals. As a result, over the course of 1560 the Nîmes
town council, recruited from this group, rapidly lost the will to act
against heresy.
The crown was deeply concerned by the Nîmes town council’s
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waning zeal, but its attempts to alter this state of affairs only made mat-
ters worse. Royal troops entered the town, and with their support the
crown ordered that special elections for consuls be held at which only
Catholics could be candidates. But this unconstitutional action only
further alienated the town’s legal governing elites, who were extremely
attached to local liberties and due legal forms. In early 1561 the Prot-
estant movement, hoping to extend its support among the political
classes, organized around a cahier de doléances for the forthcoming meet-
ing of the national Estates General. The cahier’s provisions show that
it embodied contractualist principles of limited government. Poverty,
war, and high taxes seem to have been the primary concerns for the
political elite, and they believed that arbitrary government caused them
all. These later Protestant recruits, although they were no doubt reli-
gious, were thus less interested in abstract theology than in practical
ethics, and in the church’s role in the world.9
Eight days after the Protestants rammed the cahier through the
town council, they officially organized the Nîmes consistory, the gov-
erning body of the Protestant church. From March 1561 to February
1562, consistory records show, the top of the town’s elite, its judicial
officials, finally converted to Protestantism, thus cementing the move-
ment’s successes; by early 1562, 60 percent of the twenty-six présidial
members had become Protestants. As conversions accelerated, Prot-
estant power grew, and in late 1561 they took over Nîmes’s Catholic
churches, including the cathedral and the chapel of the town hospi-
tal. Many clergy fled; some converted. Catholic control of the coun-
cil lasted only one year: it was so unpopular that at the end of 1561,
the crown authorized a special election, which brought the Protes-
tants triumphantly to power. Thus by early 1562 Protestants had con-
verted the key members of the elite, and by 1563, when the Protestants
began to sell off church property, only a hard core of religious Catholics
remained unconverted. Catholics became a minority among the elite:
although they retained a significant minority presence on the présidial,
they were a small minority among the town’s merchants, bourgeois,
lawyers, and professionals and were concentrated in low-status occu-
pations, including agriculture and lesser artisan trades, especially food
trades such as bakers, butchers, and the like.10 Nonetheless, members of
Nîmes’s political elite did not take over power in the town’s Protestant
9 This paragraph and the next summarize the argument of my dissertation, and interested
readers should refer to it for more information on these topics.
10 Catholics concentrating in the food trades was quite common in France: see, e.g., Penny
Roberts, A City in Conflict: Troyes during the French Wars of Religion (Manchester, 1996), 126. For a
table showing the process among Nîmes’s elite families, see Tulchin, ‘‘Reformation in Nîmes,’’ 355.
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consistory. Instead, the merchants and bourgeois who were the consis-
tory’s first leaders continued to lead it. Despite persistent tensions with
the political elite of magistrates, they called on its assistance in deal-
ing with political issues. In short, the two groups worked together to
preserve the Protestant movement.
Peacetime Struggles and the
Victory of the Catholic Party
The crown saw that letting Nîmes choose its own political leaders was
a serious mistake; indeed, because of the mounting tide of heresy,
the crown was in danger of losing control of the entire province of
Languedoc. In 1563 the crown therefore named a new governor: Henri
de Montmorency, seigneur de Damville. Damville began a progress
through the province to survey his new domain. On November 16 Dam-
ville arrived in Nîmes, staging his own entry, accompanied by a small
band of troops and a significant entourage of dignitaries, both civil
and official, including members of the Parlement of Toulouse and sev-
eral bishops. He promptly engineered the overthrow of the Protestant
party and their replacement with Catholic consuls for the following
year, 1564. He also ordered that the Catholic clergy be permitted to
return. The new regime was led by Robert des Georges. Des Georges,
like François de Gras, was a lawyer for the cathedral chapter. He had
been one of the first people to complain about the growth of Protes-
tantism in Nîmes.11 His selection showed that Damville was determined
to put the Catholic leadership in charge. The new council duly began
to rebuild Catholicism in Nîmes: it immediately reestablished the tradi-
tion of hiring a preacher for Lent and, in addition, paid a priest to say
Mass every day in the cathedral. The council also hired a new, Catholic
chaplain for the hospital.12
The Catholic consuls could not pursue a completely hard-line pol-
icy. First, the council asked that ‘‘the garrisons of soldiers be removed,
except that the château remain guarded.’’ Even the hard-line Catholic
consuls felt that the troops were an expensive menace to local liber-
ties. (Royal troops loose in the town were also likely to do more harm
than good. Even if the council members had been prepared to toler-
11 On Damville’s appointment, see Claude Tievant, Le gouverneur de Languedoc pendant les pre-
mières guerres de religion (1559–1574): Henri de Montmorency-Damville (Paris, 1993), 94. See Ménard
4.15.37–41, 43–44, 47–48, pp. 380–84, 387–89, and Archives Municipales de Nîmes (hereafter
AMN), LL10, fols. 1–3, for Damville’s arrival, the elections, and the town council deliberations.
For des Georges, see Millet, ‘‘City Converted,’’ 216n150; and Ménard 4, Preuves, 240–41.
12 On the Lenten preacher, the priest at the cathedral, the hospital, and Tuffan, see AMN,
LL10, fols. 7–8 and v, and fol. 10.
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ate their presence, they knew well that moderates would be driven into
the Protestant party if the troops stayed.) Second, the Observantine
friars, whose monastery had been sacked by the Protestants, asked for
alms so that they could pay to move back into town.The council replied
that, given the charges for the king’s troops, they could not afford to
assist them. Third, they never even discussed buying back the church
property that the Protestants had sold off. In short, they were not such
zealous Catholics that they were prepared to forgo any financial con-
sideration or to renounce local autonomy.13 The trouble was that recon-
verting Nîmes would take a substantial financial investment, but the
inevitable fiscal burden was likely to provoke so much resentment that
the attempt would be counterproductive. Reestablishing Catholic wor-
ship, disavowing Protestant emissaries, and removing Protestants from
positions of authority were satisfying victories, but they were unlikely
to persuade many Protestants to return to the Catholic fold.
In late 1564 the crown was able to repeat its intervention into
Nîmes’s consular elections, because the king himself, Charles IX, vis-
ited Nîmes in December, around election time. He ordered that two
nominees be selected by lot for each position, with Governor Dam-
ville to make the final choice. Of the two candidates, Damville selected
François de Gras to be first consul. De Gras was, along with his pre-
decessor des Georges, the cathedral chapter’s lawyer: the result shows
that Damville was again determined to keep the Catholic leadership
in power and probably manipulated the lottery system to further his
goal. (De Gras was eventually murdered in the Michelade.) Furious
Protestant protests were of no avail.14 The new consuls undertook a new
initiative, to petition the king for further help. They had three main
demands: First, they wanted the Mass restored. Second, they insisted
that the edicts of pacification be obeyed.Third, they wanted Protestants
removed from the présidial court. However, this last demand required
a substantial cash outlay, because the judges of the présidial would have
to be reimbursed for the purchase price of their offices. The consuls
wanted the crown rather than the town to foot the bill. Unsurprisingly,
the crown refused this request.15
13 AMN, LL10, fols. 12–13v, and Ménard 4.15.48, 388–89. In French, the quotation reads,
‘‘l’on poursuyvra devers Mond. Sr. Dampville que les garnisons de gens de guerre soient ostées
sauf que le chasteau soit gardé.’’ On the sale of church property, see the account in Emmanuel Le
Roy Ladurie, The Peasants of Languedoc, trans. John Day (Urbana, IL, 1974), 176–80.
14 On the king’s visit, see Ménard 4.15.58–67, 398–404. The original four candidates were
François de Gras, Jean Gregoire, Louis Guiraud, and Barthelemy Bastid, dit Odoable. As a result
of the Protestant protests, the second and fourth consuls were replaced—by Jacques Finor, bour-
geois, and Pierre du Fesc, laboureur, who were equally Catholic. They all appear on several lists of
contemporary Catholics, including that in Puech, ‘‘Débuts de la Réforme à Nîmes,’’ 181–83.
15 Ménard 4.15.68, 404–5, and Preuves, 327–28. It is indicative of the unusual religious
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In March 1565, during a visit to Toulouse, Charles IX issued a
decree that tried to redress Catholic grievances to some degree but that
also showed the limitations of royal support for Catholicism in Nîmes.
On the one hand, the king ordered that until Catholic worship was
restored, the income from all benefices where the Mass was not being
celebrated should be seized. On the other hand, he ordered that Protes-
tants not be excluded from office because of their religion, that they be
given two lots on which to build churches, and that royal troops be con-
fined to barracks in the château.The Protestants proceeded to build on
the sites allocated to them, and in a demonstration of their members’
prestige the first stones of the foundation were laid by President Guil-
laume Calvière, the presiding judge of the présidial court, along with
Denis de Brueys, seigneur de Saint-Chaptes, the juge criminel, and other
members of the court. In Nîmes, however, possession was nine-tenths
of the law, and Charles’s other commands were not obeyed. Protestants
had as little ability to force Catholics to share the council as Catholics
did to force Protestants to give up their hold on benefices. If Catholics
were going to improve their religious position, they would have to take
measures that did not rely on Protestant cooperation.16
In late 1565 the crown intervened again and imposed its own
Catholic group of men on Nîmes’s government.17 But this does not seem
to have been enough for Nîmes’s increasingly frustrated Catholics:
beginning in 1565, their leadership pursued bolder policies. Shortly
after Charles IX’s decree, the Catholic church in Nîmes reasserted its
authority and reestablished the Mass in the cathedral. In May 1566 the
chapter published a schedule of masses, indicating which priest was
assigned which week, and a priest, Julien Corbon (later murdered in
the Michelade), and a boy were hired to improve the choir; at later
meetings they hired more choirboys and an organist. Although the
canons were prepared to vote collectively to restore the Mass, they
were not necessarily willing to stick their necks out and perform the
ceremony; throughout the summer and fall many of the canons failed
to show up when it was their turn to perform the rite. Presumably,
situation in Nîmes that although institutional rivalries between municipal governments and royal
courts were common, it was far more common that the court was Catholic and the town’s gov-
ernment Protestant. Such rivalries were also associated with violence elsewhere in France, in the
Protestant uprising in Toulouse in 1562, for example.
16 Ménard 4.15.72, 406–8, and Preuves, 11 (laying the foundation stones), 328–30.
17 The new consuls were Jean Saurin, Jean de Combes, Louis Grimaldi, and Bernard Cor-
conne. All of the new consuls except de Combes had attended the meeting in 1561 that marked
the formation of the Catholic party in Nîmes. Corconne was also the only elector who defied the
Protestant consensus and voted for the Catholic nominees for consul in 1561. On the elections,
see Ménard 5.16.1, 1–2. For the first meeting of Catholics, see Puech, ‘‘Débuts de la Réforme à
Nîmes,’’ 181. For Corconne’s voting, see AMN, LL9, fols. 274–81.
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standing at the altar, the priests felt like easy targets. Still, the situa-
tion gradually improved, and in early 1567 the chapter went even fur-
ther, ordering the revival of a mass in honor of the Virgin and of the
town’s Corpus Christi procession. In June 1566 the cathedral chapter
also showed its frustration at the failed policy of the preceding years by
taking out its anger on the Catholic leadership: it removed des Georges
and de Gras from their positions as the chapter’s lawyers, complaining
of their ‘‘notorious absences.’’ They were replaced by Guy de Rochette,
another leading Catholic lawyer. He was younger than his predecessors.
This may have made him more prepared to pursue more extreme poli-
cies: des Georges, for example, had first served as first consul in 1546
and thus perforce had long-standing connections with Protestants pre-
dating the religious split.18
At the end of January 1566 Antoine de Crussol, a leading local
nobleman, took credit for reestablishing the Mass in a letter to the
king.19 But the tougher Catholic political line seems to predate his ar-
rival, and therefore it seems likely that the new tone is due more to the
efforts of local Catholics, whether lay or clerical, who were emboldened
by Charles’s decree. More plausibly, Crussol, a moderate Calvinist who
eventually returned to Catholicism, was happy to make it appear to the
king that, despite his own views, he was prepared to permit a certain
degree of freedom to Nîmes’s Catholics. It is also possible that this let-
ter is part of his gradual shift to the Catholic side. The consistency with
which the church’s lawyers became first consul suggests that the clergy
was in charge of planning local Catholic strategy: naming them to the
position may have been in effect a directive to the Catholic party to
make those people its leaders. But that is only an inference, and it seems
unlikely that the church could have risked alienating its embattled sup-
porters with brusque commands. Instead, such decisions were probably
the product of a collective process.
Protestants, of course, were unhappy with the new, bolder policies
being pursued by their Catholic opponents in the council chamber and
the cathedral. Attempting to undo the effects of the royal order, at the
end of 1566 Protestants mounted a determined attempt to regain some
of the power they thought their position in town entitled them to.They
proposed appointing the seneschal, Jean (II) de Senneterre, to pre-
side over the elections. This led to a complex series of negotiations: in
the end, the Catholic party agreed to send two representatives to meet
18 Millet, ‘‘City Converted,’’ 215–16 and n. 150. For des Georges’s previous service as consul,
see Ménard 6, Successions généalogiques.
19 Claude Devic and Joseph Vaissete, Histoire générale de Languedoc, 15 vols. (Toulouse, 1872–
92), 11.39.25.
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with two Protestants.The Protestants proposed splitting the four consul
positions evenly between the two religions. Although the meeting took
place, the Catholic representatives, once again the lawyers and former
first consuls des Georges and de Gras, refused to make any concessions,
and the meeting broke up without any agreement. Instead, the council
chose an uncompromisingly Catholic slate for the next year. Rochette,
newly chosen to be the lawyer for the cathedral chapter, was picked, by
the suspicious workings of the lottery system, to be first consul.20
During 1567, increasingly bitter relations between the two religions
across France made the resumption of civil war likely.The trouble began
in 1565, when Spain destroyed a French colony on the Florida coast,
beginning a chill in the relationship between Paris and Madrid. In the
summer of 1565 the Duke of Alva, one of King Philip II of Spain’s chief
advisers, met with Catherine de Medici and Charles IX at Bayonne.
The talks resulted in no agreement. The following year, a Protestant
revolt broke out in the Netherlands, and in the summer of 1567, on his
way to repress the revolt, Alva led a Spanish army along France’s east-
ern frontiers. The presence of this large army worried even the French
crown, and Alva’s purpose was yet more worrisome to the French Prot-
estant party. The crown decided to raise troops, but the Catholic duc
de Montmorency and the leading Protestant nobleman, the prince de
Condé, fought over who would be in supreme command. Protestants
were worried that royal troops could be turned against them if they
were not in control; as the dispute continued, they even began to won-
der whether Alva and Catherine had agreed to some secret plan of
coordinated repression. To forestall any such plot, France’s Protestant
leadership organized a nationwide rising for late September, called by
historians the Second Civil War. A crucial part of the Protestant plan
was an attempt (which failed) to kidnap the king.21
In Nîmes tensions were already high. Four successive groups of
Catholic consuls had managed to reestablish a significant Catholic
ritual presence in the town and to infuriate the town’s Protestants,
but they had not made many converts, who might have strengthened
their party. Nonetheless, the crown attempted to build up the Catholic
party for the coming trial of strength. On April 10, 1567, as renewed
20 The other consuls included Jean Baudan, François Aubert, and Cristol Ligier. Baudan
was also a vehement Catholic, as is evident from his fiercely Catholic will, which disinherited any of
his sons should they desert the church. AMN, LL10, fols. 130–36, cited in Millet, ‘‘City Converted,’’
188–89. For Baudan’s will see ADG, IIE36, vol. 058, fol. 617 (May 25, 1562).
21 See Knecht, Rise and Fall, 397; J. H. M. Salmon, Society in Crisis: France in the Sixteenth Century
(London, 1975), 68–70; Mack P. Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 1562–1629 (Cambridge, 1995),
63–64; and J. H. Mariéjol, La réforme et la Ligue, l’Edit de Nantes, 1559–1598, vol. 6, pt. 1, of Histoire
de France, ed. Ernest Lavisse (Paris, 1904), 96.
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civil war loomed, Charles IX issued letters patent directed to the sene-
schals, granting police powers to Nîmes’s consuls and the consuls of a
number of other towns in the region. This undercut the authority of
Nîmes’s Protestant-controlled présidial court. Some Protestants appar-
ently feared that this was the signal for a new round of oppression,
and word circulated that the Protestants meant to overthrow the gov-
ernment. In May the town council informed the royal lieutenant in
Languedoc, the vicomte de Joyeuse, about these rumors, and asked for
his assistance in quelling any potential revolt. He was unable to pro-
vide any: the situation was increasingly volatile, and he had few forces to
spare. Grain prices also appear to have surged, which could hardly have
helped induce a calmer atmosphere. At the same time in Nîmes, the
king’s peace was endangered by disputes between the two commanders
of the royal forces, Captains Bolhargues and La Garde. In May 1567 the
town council became alarmed enough to attempt mediation. Given the
growing hostility between the Protestant and Catholic parties in Nîmes
and across France, these disputes were particularly worrisome for the
town’s Catholic administration. In an effort to placate Bolhargues, the
consuls asked for La Garde’s removal, but they failed to obtain it, and
in any case their confidence in Bolhargues was misplaced. The dis-
pute between the two captains greatly contributed to the breakdown
of Catholic control and to the massacre that followed. The Protestant
party was able to exploit the dispute to turn Bolhargues against his
Catholic masters, to seize power, and to commit the Michelade.22
The Uprising
The uprising in Nîmes was coordinated with the national Protestant
plan. On September 27 Jacques de Crussol and his brother Gaillot
came to Nîmes to pass the word about the nationwide rising that was
22 On police powers see Devic and Vaissete, Histoire générale de Languedoc, 9.39.28–29, and
Ménard 5.16.11–12, 6–7. On dissension between the two captains, see Ménard 5.16.12, 7, and AMN,
LL10, fol. 191: ‘‘Par M. le premier consul a esté expouzé que en la present ville s’assemblent plu-
sieurs gens qu’on ne peut scavoir à quelles fins ne pourquoi ils y sont et d’ailleurs que entre le capi-
taine La Garde qui est logé au château et le cappitaine Bollargues ont quelque differant et noise
que pourroit causer a la ville une sedition et tumulte bien grand. Et a fin d’y proprement remedier
seroit besoing en advertir Monsgr. de Joyeuse lieutenant pour le Roy en pays et gouvernement de
Languedoc et depputer gens pour se transporter la part ou il sera. Led. de Gras a esté d’advis qu’il
est expedient pour eviter l’inconvenient qui pourroit ensyvre d’envoyer promptement un homme
espres par devers mon dit sieur de Joyeuse qui est à Lodun ou en Avignon affin qu’il luy plaise à
pourvoir et mesmes de renier [i.e., discharge?] led. capitaine La Garde de sa garnison, attendu
qu’il y a longuement demeuré et à ces fins a nommé M. le grenetier Combes.’’ The council fol-
lowed this suggestion. Also cited in Millet, ‘‘City Converted,’’ 219, 229–30. For other examples of
the role of urban militias in revolts, see William Beik, Urban Protest in Seventeenth-Century France:
The Culture of Retribution (Cambridge, 1997), 79–94.
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planned for the end of the month.23 The exact circumstances are hard
to determine, but it appears likely that the Crussols met with François
de Pavée, seigneur de Servas, who then took a leading hand in organiz-
ing the uprising.24 De Pavée, probably working with Robert LeBlanc,
the Protestant juge ordinaire of the présidial, managed to turn Captain
Bolhargues’s anger at his fellow captain into treachery to the Catho-
lic cause. Bolhargues’s position was complicated. He had first been
appointed captain of the town by Nîmes’s Catholic leadership in 1560.
The language of his 1559 marriage contract is entirely Catholic, and
most of the friends whom he chose to witness it were prominent Catho-
lics, including François de Gras, the future first consul and victim in the
Michelade. However, Bolhargues had also loyally served the Protestant
party after it took power in late 1561 and had served under de Pavée in
an expedition to support the Protestants of Beaucaire in 1562. In plot-
ting the Michelade, de Pavée probably asked LeBlanc to go with him
to meet Bolhargues because LeBlanc and Bolhargues had been friends
for years: LeBlanc was the only Protestant witness to Bolhargues’s mar-
riage contract. It is unclear whether Bolhargues persuaded his men to
follow him or simply took over the leadership of one of the Protestant
companies. In any case, his defection left the Catholic consuls with no
armed support apart from the troops in the château, who were soon
trapped there.25
Once the uprising began and its leadership moved out into the
open, nearly everyone in Nîmes’s Protestant political—but not reli-
gious—elite formed a provisional governing committee, called the Mes-
sieurs by the populace. Virtually the entire Protestant membership of
the présidial was part of it, including President Guillaume Calvière.
Several of those who were not members of the présidial were former
consuls or otherwise socially prominent. A roster of Protestant perpe-
23 Ménard 5.16.17, 9, Preuves, 27–28; Millet, ‘‘City Converted,’’ 195, 200.
24 De Pavée, although a Protestant and an important person in Nîmes’s social hierarchy,
was not prominent in the consistory (he appears in the records only once, attending a meeting
with other notables). Millet, ‘‘City Converted,’’ 200, concludes that Robert LeBlanc, juge-ordinaire
of the présidial, was the host of the meeting, while Ménard argues that the rising was discussed at
LeBlanc’s but the massacre was planned at a more private meeting at de Pavée’s. For de Pavée, see
CR, vol. 1 (1561–63), fol. 106v. See also Puech, ‘‘Débuts de la Réforme à Nîmes,’’ 211. De Pavée
was asked to take on a financial post for the consistory, but refused (CR, vol. 1, fol. 154).
25 On Bolhargues’s appointment, see Puech, ‘‘Débuts de la Réforme à Nîmes,’’ 137. For
his wedding, not previously noticed by historians, see ADG, IIE36, vol. 323, fol. 390 (contracted
on Dec. 17, 1559; the bride was Suffrenete du Valais). The other witnesses to the contract were
Tanequin Besserier, Pons Finor, François de Gras, and Jacques Rochemaure. For his actions on
behalf of the Protestant leaders of Nîmes, see Ménard 4.14.104, 15.14, 31, pp. 349, 363, 375. For a
summary of his career, see E. Haag and E. Haag, La France protestante (Paris, 1846–59), s.v. ‘‘Suau,
Mathieu,’’ which concludes, perhaps because the author was unaware that Suau was reappointed
captain of the militia, that he converted by 1563.
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Occupational Group % Cases % Cases % Cases
. High status: officials, etc.      	
. Medical professions  
   
. Legal professions      

	. Education & books     
. Clergy      

. All professions (lines 1–5)
plus other professions 19 784 62 46 53 118
. Merchants, bourgeois    
  
. All high status (lines 1–7) 26 1095 70 52 68 148
. Luxury trades  
   

. Food, drink, groceries 
     

. Leather trades  
  	  
. Clothing and textiles  	    
. Building, wood, metal     	
	. All artisans (lines 9–13) 36 1529 16 12 24 53
. Agriculture (e.g.,
laboureurs, travailleurs)  	

 	  	 

. Other (servants, military)      
. TOTAL 100 4231 100 74 100 219
Notes: ‘‘Victims’’ includes all men who were alleged to have suffered at Protestant hands, whether
they survived or not. ‘‘Perpetrators’’ includes all Protestant men who were alleged to have par-
ticipated, even if (for example) they also helped some victims escape. For Nîmes population, see
Tulchin, ‘‘Reformation in Nîmes,’’ chap. 1. For victims and perpetrators, figures are compiled from
Ménard 5, Preuves, 24–71, combined with the depositions in ADG G442 and with the database
I have compiled of all Nîmes wills and marriage contracts, 1550–62/63 (ADG series IIE). Three
female victims are excluded from the above statistics. Percentages do not sum due to round-off
error.The database is also discussed further in my dissertation (Tulchin, ‘‘Reformation in Nîmes’’).
Unknown occupations excluded.
trators shows how elite they were (table 1). However, this leadership
represented the political, rather than the religious, leadership of the
Protestant movement. Although most of the members of the Messieurs
are mentioned in the minutes of the Protestant consistory, very few of
them appear there as regular participants, or as early deacons, elders,
or other officers of the church.26 By contrast, the consistory promptly
26 For the list of Messieurs, see, e.g., Ménard 5.16.18, 18, and ADG, G442, fols. 47 and v;
but the most complete list is in Millet, ‘‘City Converted,’’ 260. Millet’s list is rather misleading
for occupations, since he calls all the doctors of law lawyers, even those who sat as judges on the
présidial; compare it with the list of présidial members in Ann Guggenheim, ‘‘Calvinism and the
Political Elite of Sixteenth-Century Nîmes’’ (PhD diss., New York University, 1968), 15. The only
Protestant member who was not one of the Messieurs was Pierre Bompar, the avocat du roi (not
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sent a representative to de Servas—which confirms that they saw him as
the leader—condemning the uprising.27 This was consistent with long-
standing policy, for the consistory had acted as a moderating force
since the movement’s earliest days. Furthermore, given the social divide
between the members of the consistory and the elite officials of the pré-
sidial, who, although Protestants, were only rarely officers of the consis-
tory, certain differences in approach were to be expected.28
Given that the leadership of the revolt held so much institutional
power in Nîmes, it is not surprising that the violence in Nîmes was
fairly well organized. Once it began, the uprising consisted of five main
phases: (1) Protestant forces asserted their control by marching in the
streets and seizing the keys to the town gates. (2) They arrested many
Catholic leaders and clergy. (3) They imprisoned the arrested Catho-
lics, sorted them out using lists they compiled, and murdered those
whom they had selected. (4) They remade the sacred geography of
Nîmes, polluting the bishop’s palace and destroying churches and the
homes of leading Catholics. (5) They laid siege to the château.
The first phase of the uprising began on September 30, when Prot-
estant forces formed into regular companies and began to march about
the town. Little is known of their composition or training, but apart
from those who had served under Captain Bolhargues, most probably
lacked military experience, although a number of witnesses listed the
names of their captains. The troops were armed, but not identically.29
As they marched, they shouted crude but effective slogans. Jeanne
Auberte reported that she heard loud noises coming from the street,
and after shepherding her children inside, she saw armed men heading
up the street shouting, ‘‘Close the shops!’’ Other witnesses heard the
Protestants saying, ‘‘To arms! To battle,’’ ‘‘Kill! Kill! Kill the papists!’’
on Guggenheim’s list, since he joined at some point after 1560, according to Puech, Une ville, 80).
Many of the Messieurs appear just once in consistory records: at an important meeting called on
Mar. 28, 1562, CR, fol. 106v, which was about military preparations for the beginning of the wars.
These men therefore probably had political issues uppermost in their minds. Exceptions include
Jean Bertrand (see CR, fols. 1, 106v), Pierre Maltrait (ibid., fol. 1), and the Rozel family, which
was heavily involved—one witness mentioned going to a meeting of the Messieurs that was held
at Pierre Rozel’s house (Ménard 5, Preuves, 43). The Rozels had been leaders of the Protestant
movement since the beginning (see, e.g., Tulchin, ‘‘Reformation in Nîmes,’’ 364ff.).
27 For the consistory’s condemnation, see Ménard 5.16.18, 22, citing now-lost consistory
deliberations.
28 See Tulchin, ‘‘Reformation in Nîmes,’’ 329–30. In this they were following Calvin: see
Stuart Foster, ‘‘Pierre Viret and France, 1559–1565’’ (PhD diss., Saint Andrews University, 2000),
40–43. I consulted this dissertation at the H. Henry Meeter Center for Calvin Studies at Calvin
College.
29 Catherine de Parades saw ‘‘a large troop of men at arms, some [with] pistols, arquebuses,
halberds, and others’’ (Ménard 5, Preuves, 42). There are a number of lists of the captains of the
Protestant companies. See, e.g., Ménard 5, Preuves, 30.
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In one probably exceptional reference to the glory days that would fol-
low a Protestant victory, the troops shouted, ‘‘Kill, kill! New world, new
world!’’ All of the surviving reports come from hostile witnesses, but
to judge from them, the Protestant forces’ anger far outweighed their
eschatological hopes. The Protestants marched around town mainly to
intimidate the Catholic community.30
After asserting their control over the town’s streets, the Protestants
sought to seize the keys to the town’s gates. Protestants and Catholics
commonly tried to seize the gates as part of attempts to take over towns;
they did so for both practical and symbolic reasons. In Nîmes, Prot-
estant control of the gates meant that royal or other outside Catho-
lic troops could not intervene to prevent the Protestants from taking
whatever steps they wished. It also threatened Catholic residents, since
they could not escape if the Protestants attempted to arrest or, as
in the Michelade, murder them. Furthermore, in Nîmes, Catholics
were heavily concentrated in agricultural occupations, which employed
about one-third of the adult male population. When Protestants con-
trolled the gates, they also controlled the agricultural workers’ access to
their farms and gardens, their assets and their livelihoods. At the same
time, possession of the keys to the town was an important attribute of
sovereignty; normally, Nîmes’s consuls held the keys. Possession of the
keys conferred legitimacy.31
In Nîmes’s case, the keys were in the hands of Guy de Rochette,
the first consul and the lawyer for the cathedral chapter. Our only
account of what followed relies on the description provided by Blaise
Valon, a servant of Rochette. According to Valon, Rochette took refuge
at the house of his stepfather, Jean Gregoire, a merchant who was
also a prominent Catholic and a former secretary of the bishop. When
Protestant forces, led by Jacques de Possaco, a prominent merchant
draper and early Protestant, showed up at the door demanding the
keys, Catherine Valladier, Rochette’s mother, lied and insisted that
he was not there. Rochette, accompanied by his half brother Robert
Gregoire, decided nonetheless to leave the house, hoping to use his
authority to order the Protestants to desist. To enhance his authority,
Rochette put on the red robes that identified him as a consul and went
30 For the soldiers’ cries, see Ménard 5.16.18, 11, and ADG, G442, fol. 68v, 80v, 91v.
31 In Poitiers, local tradition held that when a traitor tried to steal the mayor’s keys dur-
ing the Hundred Years War, the statue of the Virgin Mary in the town’s cathedral took them into
her hands for safekeeping. See Hilary Bernstein, ‘‘Politics and Civic Culture in Sixteenth-Century
Poitiers’’ (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1996), 328; for the Protestant takeover, see 315–16. In
Dijon, Protestants raised barricades at each end of the rue des Forges, where they were numerous,
according to James R. Farr, Hands of Honor: Artisans and Their World in Dijon, 1550–1650 (Ithaca,
NY, 1988), 226.
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with Gregoire to summon other town officials to assist him in restoring
order, but he did not find any of them. He probably also carried the keys
with him. He then went to plead even with the Protestant companies
that he encountered as he walked, including those of Tanequin Finor,
a Protestant apothecary, who threatened him for his pains.32 Similarly,
Jean Bonaud, one of the captains of the Protestant forces, and Jean
Bertrand, a prominent early Protestant who also took a leading role
in the uprising, ‘‘turned their backs on him.’’ It seems odd that they
did not arrest him; perhaps the leader of each Protestant company had
an assigned task, and they were afraid of committing the fateful act of
arresting the first consul without orders. Finally, Rochette went to the
bishop’s palace, found Bishop Bernard d’Elbène, and cried, with tears
in his eyes, that ‘‘he did not know what to do.’’ The bishop replied that
they should pray, which they did in the front hall. At this point, accord-
ing to Valon, Captain Bolhargues arrived, along with ‘‘two hundred’’
men, arrested them, and brought them back to the Gregoire house and
locked them into the kitchen, before removing them to the house of
Guillaume l’Hermite, an early Protestant who at one time had gone into
exile in Geneva. Presumably, Bolhargues also took the keys to Nîmes’s
gates, which were soon under Protestant control. Valon, some of the
other servants, and the bishop managed to escape through a hole in
the wall separating the palace from the house of Antoine de Brueys, a
conseiller of the présidial court. De Brueys, a Protestant, hid them for the
next several days but was nonetheless eventually condemned to death
for his role in the Michelade.33
32 Valon’s deposition is in ADG, G442, fols. 42–49v. For Jean Gregoire, notarial references
refer to him as the bishop’s secretary from at least 1555 to 1562. See, e.g., ADG, IIE36, vol. 058,
fol. 617 (May 25, 1562). He is also on a list of Catholic guards chosen to guard the town on
Dec. 24, 1560, reprinted in Ménard 4, Preuves, 259. It is also likely that he was the second consul
for 1559, although town council minutes give his name as Jean Gregoire, bourgeois (Ménard 6,
Successions généalogiques). Valladier’s name comes from Ménard 5, Preuves, 71. Jacques de Possaco
was named an advertisseur at the first meeting of the Protestant consistory (CR, fol. 2). Valon
describes Rochette as ‘‘portant toutjours son chaperon rouge de consul sur son espaulle.’’ (See also
Ménard 5, Preuves, 42, 52, which confirm this detail.) Although I do not have much information on
Firmin Chabassuti, Pierre Chabassuti, likely a close relative, was a notary and a prominent Catholic
(Catholic guard, Ménard 4, Preuves, 259). Tanequin Finor’s last name is not given in the deposi-
tion, but he is the only apothecary of that first name known to me. He was a Protestant as of 1562
(CR, fol. 94) and a member of a prominent family that included Jacques (second consul in 1540,
1547, 1558, and 1565) and Pons, a bourgeois. Pierre Finor, a greffier in the next generation, was
second consul in 1596, and his daughter’s godfather was Pierre Suau’s (i.e., Captain Bolhargues’s)
son (Puech, Une ville, 219–20).
33 For Bonaud, see Ménard 5, Preuves, 30; for Bertrand, see Preuves, 57, CR, fol. 1. L’Hermite
is recorded arriving in Geneva on Oct. 16, 1559: see Paul-F. Geisendorf, ed., Livre des habitants de
Genève, 2 vols. (Geneva, 1957–63), 1:211, and in consistory records on Mar. 28, 1562, CR, fol. 107v.
De Brueys was a Protestant. Ménard 5.16.18, 13, mistakenly gives de Brueys’s first name as André.
His assistance is attested to by both Jean Tardeau (Preuves, 25) and Pierre Journet (46). For his reli-
gious affiliation, see CR, fol. 106 (attended consistory meeting). For De Brueys’s condemnation,
see Ménard 5.16.43, 44.
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I hesitate to accept Valon’s account, although Rochette’s presence
at the palace is confirmed by another witness.34 It seems too perfect.
Certainly, it was normal for an official in Rochette’s position to clothe
himself in the robes that signified his authority and to try to rally the
town’s officials, but Rochette’s attempt to reason with armed Protes-
tant forces seems foolhardy. Similarly, the scene of the arrest, with
Rochette and the bishop discovered on their knees in prayer, seems
tinged with sanctimony. In short, Valon’s account is dubious, although
it does depict how Catholics wished to imagine their leaders behaving.
As such, it is revealing. According to Valon, Rochette was a perfect
martyr: he carried no weapon and used no threats. He was a loyal son
of the church, but in this account not its lackey by any means, since
he turned to the bishop only when he could do nothing further him-
self. At the same time, Rochette’s actions risked further inflaming the
Protestants’ anger against the bishop and clergy: since Rochette knew
the Protestants were pursuing him to get the keys, his decision to find
the bishop only ensured that the bishop would be delivered into Protes-
tant hands. Perhaps Rochette meant to warn Bishop d’Elbène that ruin
was upon them. Certainly, he did not ask the bishop for assistance, nor
did he receive any: if he had wanted something other than prayer, he
did not complain when prayer was all he got. The image of the com-
pany at prayer right inside the bishop’s front door suggests that they
anticipated their arrest. Other Catholic accounts of martyrdom sug-
gest a yearning to die, to replicate and thus to activate in the present
Christ’s sacrifice on the cross. Something similar seems at work in the
report that Father Jean Quatrebars, prior of the Augustinian monastery
in Nîmes, when trying to hearten his fellow prisoners on the way to their
execution, ‘‘exhorted them to patience, telling them that he saw the
heavens open to receive them.’’35 It is worth noting that Quatrebars’s
statement was broadly Christian rather than narrowly sectarian—and
therefore he was sending a message directed as much to his Protestant
captors as to his Catholic flock.
In some instances, even when Catholics escaped death, they were
anxious to show that their deliverance was not due to the merciful
34 Ménard 5, Preuves, 46–47. The other witness was Journet; his account lacks Valon’s color-
ful detail. Ménard 5.16.18, 12–13, accepts Valon’s account absolutely and even heightens it. For
information on Tardeau, see his deposition in Ménard 5, Preuves, 25–27; and Puech, ‘‘Débuts de
la Réforme à Nîmes,’’ 195.
35 On Catholic martyrdom, see Brad S. Gregory, Salvation at Stake: Christian Martyrdom in
Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, 1999), 250–314, esp. 274 (killing at prayer) and 279–80 (longing
for death). Quatrebars’s quote is from Ménard 5, Preuves, 52–53. In French, ‘‘Cathrebars donnoit
coeur auxdicts catholiques, et les exhortoit à patience, leur disant qu’il voyoit les cieux ouverts
pour les recepvoir.’’
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behavior of Protestants. That would have given their opponents too
much credit. Instead, they attributed their survival to the effect of other
Protestant vices, including avarice and perfidy. According to Pierre
Journet, a clerk who worked for one of the bishop’s aides, when Protes-
tant forces came to présidial member Antoine de Brueys’s house looking
for the bishop and the little troop of Catholics hiding there, de Brueys
advised them to bribe the attackers. A bargain was agreed on. The
bishop paid sixty ecus for his release, and correspondingly lesser sums
were negotiated for the others. The Catholics handed over everything
they had, including some of their clothes. The Protestants dumped the
bishop and his manservant outside of town.The others were taken away
and murdered. Journet explained that he had survived only because
the Protestants, having wounded him in the side and the thigh, had left
him for dead on the stairs in de Brueys’s house.36
In the second phase of the Michelade, after the Protestant forces
had taken control of the gates, they arrested other prominent Catho-
lics. François de Gras, the ex-consul, was also a target. Guillaume l’Her-
mite arrived with a body of Protestant forces to search de Gras’s house
and that of his neighbor François le Roux. After their search was com-
pleted, l’Hermite told de Gras that he had to come with them because
someone wanted to speak to him. Antoinette de Massilhan, de Gras’s
wife, then started to cry, but de Gras replied that he had to go see
what they wanted, adding that ‘‘our Lord will guard [me], and [I] can
only die once.’’ Presumably, this remark was intended to tell his wife to
be brave in the face of their enemies—it could hardly have reassured
her. L’Hermite wanted to take Jean Canonge, the tutor to de Gras’s
children, as well, but de Gras prevailed on him to let him stay, saying
that there was no other man in the house. De Gras was then taken to
l’Hermite’s house.37
It seems clear that the Protestant leadership intended to institute a
general roundup of Catholic lay and clerical leaders. Protestant forces
targeted at least eight of the sixteen men who had served as consul
between 1564 and 1567, when Catholics had been in power. Although
only Rochette and de Gras were killed, all of Rochette’s fellow consuls
were arrested.38 Similarly, of the nine Catholic members of the présidial,
36 Ménard 5, Preuves, 47.
37 Jean Canonge’s deposition is in ADG, G442, fols. 113v–118v. (In French, the quotation
reads ‘‘disant que Nre. Sr. le garderoit et qu’il ne pouvoit mourir que une foys.’’ De Gras’s wife’s
name comes from Ménard 5, Preuves, 71. The incident is also in Ménard 5.16.18, 14.
38 Ménard 5.16.18, 21. The other consuls who were victims were Etienne André (Ménard 5,
Preuves, 60); Jean Voluntat (ADG, G442, fol. 124v); Jean Saurin (Ménard 5, Preuves, 28); and
Bernard Corconne (ADG, G442, fols. 69v–71). Interestingly, there is no evidence that Robert
des Georges, first consul in 1564 and de Gras’s colleague as lawyer for the cathedral chapter,
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only two do not appear among the victims, although a number of them
managed to escape and only one, Jacques Barrière, paid for his reli-
gion with his life. He fled to the land he owned near Calvisson, but the
Protestants seized him there.39
In the third phase of the Michelade, once the Catholics were under
arrest, the Protestant forces imprisoned them while attempting to de-
cide their fate. Some of those arrested were taken to Pierre Cellerier’s
house, as well as to the town hall and to Guillaume l’Hermite’s house.
Cellerier, a jeweler, was like l’Hermite an early, prominent Protestant.
The prisoners’ conditions were arduous. Most of the surviving evidence
concerns conditions in the town hall, although Nicolas Pradier, the sec-
retary of the town council, who saw Gregoire and Rochette escorted to
the town hall, refused to watch them leave because ‘‘he did not dare
leave his room, for fear of being massacred with them.’’ Rochette and
Gregoire were kept separately from the many other prisoners, who were
confined upstairs and in the basement.The lower chamber, although in
the end a safer holding place, had a sinister reputation, since it was used
as an abattoir to butcher animals for the sick during Lent. The symbol-
ism was surely not accidental. For much of the first day, as they awaited
their fate, no one came to see them. This must have been disquieting,
since it implied that the leaders wanted to kill them, rather than to
interrogate them. Apparently no food was brought to the prisoners:
Pradier said that they were ‘‘dying of hunger.’’ Moreover, the Messieurs
taunted them. Cellerier, perhaps referring to the abattoir where the
prisoners were held, suggested that they should eat a large meal of meat
(grand chere); they replied that they were in no position to do so. Celle-
rier reassured them with deliberate ambiguity, saying that they would
‘‘leave very soon,’’ but he did not say whether they would be released
from custody or from life. In short, their imprisonment was designed
to terrify even those Catholics who were not destined to be killed.40
was arrested in 1567; however, he was killed on Nov. 15, 1569 (Puech, ‘‘Débuts de la Réforme à
Nîmes,’’ 181).
39 The two were Tanequin Besserier and Jean-Poldo d’Albenas. For a list of Catholic mem-
bers of the présidial as of 1560, see Guggenheim, ‘‘Calvinism and the Political Elite,’’ 223. Of the
eleven she lists, two, Pierre Robert and Robert de Brueis, had died and been replaced by Protes-
tants before 1567 (Puech, ‘‘Débuts de la Réforme à Nîmes,’’ 84, and Une ville, 80), unless Ménard
(5.16.18, 14) is correct and de Brueis had been replaced by George Gevaudan, who was arrested
as a Catholic in the Michelade. Guggenheim, ‘‘Calvinism and the Political Elite,’’ notes, 192n, 193,
cites Ménard 5.16.18, 10, that Barrière, Ruffi, Jean de Montcalm, and d’Albenas fled town dur-
ing the Michelade. The others were Honoré Richier (ADG, G442, fol. 72); Pierre Vallete (Ménard
5.16.18, 14); and Pierre Saurin (Ménard 5.16.18, 20, 10, 26).
40 For evidence of Cellerier’s Protestantism, see CR, fol. 17v. For Pradier’s testimony, see
Ménard 5, Preuves, 55. In French, ‘‘tous lesdicts prisonniers furent menés les ungs après les aul-
tres au supplice, mais qui le conduisit, dict ne le sçavoir . . . car n’osoit il qui dépose sourtir de sa
chambre, de peur d’estre massacré avec eulx.’’ For the use of the basement and for the statement
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The leaders of the conspiracy had prepared for the arrests. First
consul Rochette’s servant Blaise Valon testified that he saw Guillaume
Calvière, the president of the présidial, holding a list of Protestants who
were to be armed. Similarly, prisoners who were scheduled to die were
also placed on a list, although since many of those arrested were not
killed, there was probably some confusion or conflict among the Protes-
tant leaders about some of the prisoners’ ultimate fates. In the middle
of the night of September 30, groups of soldiers, including Cellerier,
consulting their lists, removed some of the most prominent Catholic
officials, including Rochette and de Gras, as well as the priests whom
they had detained in the basement of the town hall. Their officers
moved them to the courtyard of the bishop’s palace, a large open area
with a well in the center. There they were killed, by sword, dagger, or
pistol, and their bodies dumped down the well. Jean Rovyer, a leather-
worker, testified that he saw the area the following day, ‘‘all covered
with blood and the water of the well all red, and he saw several dead
bodies in it.’’ Jean Vallat, a merchant, claimed that he had gone to see
the well afterward, and there were ‘‘certain loud noises’’ coming from
it, which gave him ‘‘a great fright and made his hair stand on end.’’
Another witness, Pierre Rovyer, claimed that his stepfather, Pierre du
Fesc, had told him that he had seen the bodies being tossed in and
had counted 108 of them. Jean Rovyer claimed to have heard from
another leatherworker that Jacques d’Estenet, a gardener, and Guil-
laume l’Hermite were responsible for most of the dirty work. Another
witness, Jean Bouze, gave a list of more than a dozen perpetrators. He
named some wealthy men, like the Protestant Jean Bertrand, but most
were more modest men: leatherworkers, hosiers, and other artisans.
They were more suitable for such disagreeable tasks. There appears to
have been an element of inversion in the choice of the bishop’s palace
for the murders: the aim was to destroy the Catholic party at the site
most closely associated with its power.41
that no one came to see them, see Ménard 5, Preuves, 49. For the Cellerier quote, see ADG, G442,
fols. 120 and v. In French, the quotation reads, ‘‘Et ayant ilz [the prisoners, including the witness,
Mathieu Raymond] demeuré quelque espasse de temps aud. chambre d’hault [in the maison con-
sulaire], il survindrent pleusieurs de lad. nouvelle religion armés d’arquebouses ou pistolles, entre
aultres Me. Pierre Celarier, orphevre, quy dit auds. prisonniers qu’ilz fissent grand chere et lhors
aulcungs desd. prisonniers leur respondirent qu’il n’estoient en lieu pour se faire, suy quoy led.
Cellarier leur dit qu’ilz en sortiroient bien tost.’’
41 On the list of those to be arrested, see ADG, G442, fol. 120v; for Jean Rovyer, see ADG,
G442, fol. 89; for Vallat, see fols. 52v–53. In French, ‘‘passant une foys aupres dicelluy ouys quelque
grand bruit venant dud. puys comme aussi ceulx de lad. religion novelle disoient publicquement
avoir ouy led. grant bruict que occasionna de se arrester ung peu aupres led. puys pour scavoir si
cella estoit veritable, et treuva qu’il estoit ainsin, et entendist comme dit est led. bruit tel quy faisoit
frayeur bien grande et elisser les poilhz.’’ For Pierre Rovyer, see fol. 79; for Bouze, see Ménard 5,
Preuves, 59. For the rest, see Ménard 5.16.18, 16–17.
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In one respect the Protestant party showed both mercy and practi-
cality: they attacked only men, not women. Indeed, a prominent Prot-
estant leader, the lawyer Charles Rozel, warned some women to lock
themselves behind their doors to protect themselves. That does not
mean that Catholic women were exempt from suffering: they lost hus-
bands, sons, and so forth. When Rochette’s and Gregoire’s mother and
stepfather heard the rumor of their deaths, they broke into loud lamen-
tations, exclaiming that they had ‘‘no other children.’’ Furthermore,
although women were not targeted for arrest, they were imprisoned
if they did not obey the new regime. Jeanne Corconne attempted to
leave town, since her husband had fled for Beaucaire and she wanted to
live ‘‘according to God’s commandments.’’ She was arrested on the road
and brought back to Nîmes. On this occasion Charles Rozel was not so
gallant: he told Corconne that her husband was ‘‘a wicked papist.’’ She
spent several days in jail, along with a number of other women, before
being released.The primary goal was to drive the Catholics from power,
not to kill them all.42
The Messieurs claimed to have no doubt that they would be
obeyed: one of them, Jean Bertrand, boasted that ‘‘there is no rea-
son to fear the populace, because they will not do anything that we
and the other officers and principals of the long and short robes do
not make them do.’’ Nonetheless, they performed their most shocking
acts at night, because, as another Protestant, Jacques Nicot, explained,
they did not want to ‘‘scandalize the people.’’ Fearing the authorities,
they also hesitated to sign orders that might later incriminate them.
When Catherine de Parades demanded a signed order before she would
pay a special tax on Catholics, Pierre Rozel, brother of Charles and
also a member of the Messieurs, replied, ‘‘Would you do it if you were
in our place?’’ Rozel also worried about spies. Most witnesses insisted
that the Messieurs were in complete control and therefore completely
responsible at all times. One witness, Vidal Caintemesse, a merchant,
said that ‘‘the ordinary people [menu peuple] were upset on two sepa-
rate occasions last summer and took up arms against the soldiers of the
garrison’’ and that the elite had repressed them then, so it was obvi-
ous that if there was rebellion now, they could have controlled it.43 The
witnesses were anxious to see as many Protestant leaders as possible
42 For Rochette and Gregoire’s parents’ reaction, see ADG, G442, fol. 45v. For Corconne’s
story, see Ménard 5, Preuves, 40. Ménard also comments that women were not the principal objects
of Protestant aggression: see 5.16.18, 22. For Rozel’s warning to the women, see ADG, G442, fol.
92. Cf. Davis, ‘‘Rites of Violence,’’ 175.
43 For Bertrand’s comment, see ADG, G442, fol. 56v; for Nicot’s, fol. 63v; for Rozel’s,
Ménard 5, Preuves, 43, and for a similar comment, 38; for Rozel’s concern about spying, 57; and
for Caintemesse’s comment, ADG, G442, fol. 99v, cited in Millet, ‘‘City Converted,’’ 229.
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punished, but they do not appear to have improved on the evidence.
Some Catholics did escape despite the wishes of the Messieurs. Some
Protestants, for example, were unwilling to participate in the round-
ups and even helped Catholics escape. Pierre Blaise, one of the bishop’s
servants, escaped by finding refuge with a man named Jean, a Protes-
tant baker. This case is striking, since Blaise’s ignorance of the man’s
last name suggests that they did not know each other well, although it
is possible that Blaise was deliberately keeping the name of this par-
ticular Protestant from the authorities. Louis Blachière was on his way
to being killed, so he thought, when ‘‘someone called Christol, a wool
carder, son of Simon Vidalot the butcher,’’ a member of the Protes-
tant companies, came up to him, said that ‘‘this one should not be
killed,’’ and led him back to prison. Blachière was eventually released.
Again, the hesitant way Blachière named his savior suggests that they
were not well acquainted, but it is possible that Christol meant that
Blachière should be spared because he was not on the official list. In
other cases, friends and neighbors assisted Catholics in making their
escape. Jean de Roverie, the seigneur de Cabrières, hid in a well while
Protestants searched his house; then he fled to a neighbor’s. Father
Jean Bompar pretended that he wanted to pay his debts before he died
and asked to see Louis Pillet, a tanner, to pay him. Pillet brought his
‘‘grand ami le Bastel,’’ who was in Captain Bolhargues’s company, and
they arranged to bring Bompar to the house of Robert LeBlanc, one of
the principal organizers of the conspiracy, where he was hidden. Nor
was LeBlanc the only high-ranking Protestant to hide Catholics: Jean-
Guy d’Airebaudouze, a Protestant conseiller of the présidial, warned his
neighbor Jeanne Auberte that she should hide her husband, Jean Val-
lat, at her brother-in-law’s house. D’Airebaudouze was later condemned
for his role in the massacre and named as a member of the Messieurs.
Unlike LeBlanc, he did not run the risk of taking a Catholic into his own
household. Finally, some Catholics escaped by using their own wits: for
example, Father Jean Vincens hid in the suburbs and pretended to be a
cook in an inn. In short, despite Protestant efforts at efficiency, events—
in particular, deciding who lived and who died—were only partially in
their control.44
In the fourth phase of the Michelade, once the town was in Prot-
44 For Blaise, see Ménard 5, Preuves, 48; for Blachière, 50. In French, the quotation reads,
‘‘ung appellé Christol, qu’est cardeur, fils de Simon Vidalot, le bouchier.’’ Unfortunately, Chris-
tol and Simon Vidalot are unknown to me, although there was a Jean Vidalot who was a butcher.
Bompar’s testimony is in Ménard 5, Preuves, 24–25. For Roverie, see ibid., 36; for Auberte, see
ADG, G442, fol. 63v; for Vincens, see Preuves, 41. Roverie escaped this time, only to be murdered
in 1569 (Ménard 5.16.51, 55).
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estant hands and the Catholic leadership had been imprisoned, exiled,
or killed, the Protestants remade the sacred geography of Nîmes to
deny the Catholics any focal point for a revival. In the following days,
the Protestant leaders ordered every church in town destroyed, except
one, Sainte-Eugénie, which they used as a space in which to make gun-
powder. They destroyed churches even on Sunday. They also destroyed
the bishop’s palace and houses belonging to priests and some lay Catho-
lics in the town and its suburbs. They burned all of the church furni-
ture and many ecclesiastical records and pillaged the houses of some
rich Catholics. Some of the stone from the churches was sold to build-
ers. There were impositions on laypeople as well. While everyone in
town was ordered to pay special taxes to support the Protestant forces,
Catholics were ordered to pay especially high taxes, to hand over eccle-
siastical revenues, and to support soldiers billeted in their houses.
Those who complained were given more soldiers to feed. Beyond these
semilegal exactions, there was also out-and-out looting. Jacques Sau-
rin saw one of Captain Bolhargues’s servants wearing first consul Guy
de Rochette’s turquoise ring, and Father Bompar had his purse taken.
The leaders of the Michelade had little incentive to repress looting:
they wanted to terrify the Catholics into submission. Overall, Protes-
tants directed their destructive energies more at the property of Catho-
lic clergy than at the lay leadership. Some of their hatred arose from
disgust at the notion of the special holiness that Catholics supposedly
claimed for themselves but that Protestants believed was the privilege
of all Christians. But at least some Protestant leaders also believed
that the church sustained the Catholic party in crucial ways and hoped
that, shorn of this support, it would collapse. As one of the Messieurs,
the présidial conseiller Jean de Sauzet, commented, ‘‘The nests must be
destroyed, so that the birds will not return.’’45
Certainly, the killings were in at least one respect counterproduc-
tive, because they delayed the fifth phase of the Michelade, an assault
on the garrison in the château. The Protestants’ delay cost them the
advantages of surprise.46 In any case, seizing the château must have
seemed a risky undertaking, given the inexperienced troops the Protes-
tants had to command. The killings put the garrison on notice that the
45 For the destruction of the churches, see Ménard 5.16.22, 27–28, and of houses, ADG,
G442, fol. 88; in suburbs, see fol. 104v; on Sunday, see fol. 48; on taxes and billeting, see Preuves,
35, 37–38, and ADG, G442, fols. 58, 60 (a litany of impositions that concludes, ‘‘bref, n’ont omis
lesd. Messieurs user en endroict desd. catholicques d’aulcune espesse de cruaulté qu’ilz ayent peu
exeger’’). For Rochette’s ring, see Preuves, 32; for Bompar’s purse, 24. For another example, see
55. On the tendency of Protestants to attack priests, see Davis, ‘‘Rites of Violence,’’ 159–60, 179.
46 Millet, ‘‘City Converted,’’ 196, makes this point.
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conspirators meant business. But the defenders refused to be intimi-
dated: the garrison held out for six weeks, despite repeated calls for it to
surrender. At the same time, a Catholic force from Tarascon could not
relieve the defenders. Instead of trying to storm the citadel, the Mes-
sieurs ordered trenches dug, at which Catholics were required to work
or to pay to have substitutes. President Guillaume Calvière of the pré-
sidial court oversaw the digging. On November 10 the garrison, running
out of food, gave up, despite the exhortations of Captain La Garde.
Terms were eventually agreed on. The captain and nine soldiers could
leave with all of their arms and baggage, while the rest of the garrison
was limited to its swords and daggers. The Catholics who had escaped
the massacre were permitted either to return to Nîmes and promised
safety or to leave, at their choice. The actual surrender occurred on
November 15.47
Nationwide, the Second Civil War ended in a peace settlement,
signed at Longjumeau in March 1568. This essentially restored the
status quo, but was the merest pause, for hostilities resumed in Sep-
tember.48 Nor did the Michelade inaugurate a long period of Protes-
tant rule in Nîmes. Royal troops entered the town in June 1568, and
an edict of the Parlement of Toulouse, issued on March 18, 1569, con-
demned more than one hundred people to death for their participa-
tion. Many of them had had little or nothing to do with the massacre:
the authorities seem, on principle, to have put every prominent Prot-
estant on the list, including the clergy. Most of those named fled, but
four men—only one of whom, Charles Rozel, a member of the Mes-
sieurs and a longtime Protestant leader, was an important figure in the
Michelade—were caught, transported to Toulouse, and executed.Their
heads were returned to Nîmes and mounted on the four principal gates
of the town. But the Catholic triumph did not last long, either: on
November 15, 1569, Protestant forces seized Nîmes again, this time for
good.This takeover was accompanied by a second massacre, of equal or
greater size. Contemporary accounts suggest that 100–150 more Catho-
lics were murdered. Others were held for ransom. (Since the uprising
was successful, and the victorious Protestants had no incentive to inves-
tigate themselves, this second massacre is poorly documented.) After
this second bout of violence, Nîmes became a Protestant-ruled town for
a century.49
47 Ménard 5.16.19–20, 24–26.
48 Holt, French Wars of Religion, 65.
49 Ménard 5.16.27, 43–44, and 51, 31–33, 42–45, and 50–56, and Preuves, 70–74. The three
others executed were Jacques Andron, a conseiller of the présidial court; Lazare Fazendier, a retired
legal official (greffier); and Claude Garnier, a notary. Ménard (following a journal in vol. 4, Preuves,
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Catholics, Protestants, and Motives
It is impossible to determine exactly how many people died, but the
surviving records indicate that about seventy-five people suffered at the
hands of the Messieurs, and about half of them were killed (tables 1–2).
It is unclear whether the discrepancy between contemporary estimates
of one hundred killed and only about one-third that many known vic-
tims is due to defects in the statistics, contemporary exaggeration of
the death toll, or both. It is also possible that the figure of one hun-
dred killed is too low: one source suggests that eighty to ninety sol-
diers were killed outside of town, at Sommières and in other nearby
villages.50 Unnamed victims were probably less prominent than those
whose names we do know, but the statistics suggest strongly that the
Michelade was a conflict among the elite. Three-quarters of both the
victims and the alleged perpetrators belonged to high-status profes-
sions, including officials, lawyers, merchants and bourgeois, and—on
the Catholic side—clergy.The two groups were also sharply different in
other ways: most important, the relative size of the two groups shows
that the Catholic community had become a distinct minority in town,
even though most of our information is derived from Catholic sur-
vivors, who identified members of their own party more often than
their persecutors. (It is also true that the depositions were collected to
assemble a list of those responsible, which may have biased the sample
in the opposite direction.) In percentage terms, moreover, Catholics
were overwhelmingly concentrated in the clergy and legal professions,
while Protestants, although equally well represented in the law, had far
more officials on their side than Catholics did. All in all, Catholic vic-
tims in Nîmes appear to have been much more elite than Protestant
victims of Catholic massacres elsewhere. Among the alleged perpetra-
tors, the Protestant clergy was notably absent from participation, which
makes sense given the consistory’s condemnation of the uprising. As
noted earlier, about half of all recent Catholic consuls were singled out
for arrest, and more than three-quarters of all Catholic members of
the présidial were. By contrast, only about one-fifth of Nîmes’s priests
were imprisoned.51 Yet their death rate was much higher, since the
15) estimates the dead in 1569 at 100–120; Jacques-Auguste de Thou, Histoire universelle (London,
1734), 5:652, following La Popelinière, suggests 150.
50 Ménard 4, Preuves, 8 ( journal of Jacques Davin).
51 Tulchin, ‘‘Reformation in Nîmes,’’ 76, discusses the number of priests resident in Nîmes.
Although only a hundred clergy appear in notarial records in the period 1550–63, judging by
population, it seems likely that there were at least double that number. Many no doubt fled during
the troubles, and a good number also converted. Judging from the minutes of the cathedral chap-
ter, whose meetings were fairly well attended, many of Nîmes’s priests appear to have returned
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Table 2 Deaths in the Michelade by occupational category
Category Percent Cases Name Occupation Source
High status:
officials, etc. 
  J. Barrière présidial conseiller Preuves, 
G. Rochette first consul, lawyer Preuves, 
Legal
professions  
 C. Chimieu notary, sec. of bishop Preuves, 	
F. de Gras lawyer Preuves, 
? Ginestot clerk Preuves, 

R. Gregoire lawyer Preuves, 
? Luchet solliciteur Preuves, 

J. Saissac solliciteur Preuves, 
Clergy   J. Alesti canon Preuves, 
A. André curé of Millau Preuves, 	
A. Blanchon canon Preuves, 
J. Corbon singer at cathedral Preuves, 	
L. de Rocles curé of cathedral Preuves, 	
A. du Prix canon Preuves, 

M. du Prix priest Preuves, 
P. Folcrand Augustinian monk Preuves, 
? Guillaume Franciscan Preuves, 
E. Mazoyer canon Preuves, 

T. Mosque chaplain of bishop Preuves, 	
J. Paberan vicar-general of bishop Preuves, 
J. Quatrebras Augustinian prior Preuves, 	
N. Sausset prior of Jacobins Preuves, 
	 hebdomadiers G		, fol. v
High status:
artisans   A. Michel jeweler Preuves, 
Food, drink,




 J. des Aurieres brodeur/vaneur Preuves, 	
J. des Ollieres cordwainer Preuves, 
L. Doladille silkworker Preuves, 	
B. du Faux cobbler Preuves, 
A. Farelle cobbler Preuves, 
G. Guerinot leatherworker Preuves, 
Other   ? Vidal soldier of garrison Preuves, 	
(unknowns
excluded)
M. Benezet unknown Preuves, 
J. Bonhomme unknown Preuves, 	
Total  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Table 2 Continued
Notes: This list differs from both Millet, ‘‘City Converted,’’ 254–55, and Ménard 5.16.18, 22–23,
which is why I have taken some care to give the sources for each reference. Names listed in Ménard
and/or Millet but not here were omitted because I was unable to substantiate them. Preuves refers
to Ménard, vol. 5; G442 refers to ADG, G442, the additional depositions. Preuves, 71, refers to a
petition, reproduced by Ménard, which includes a list of victims compiled by the Parlement of Tou-
louse as part of the court case against the perpetrators. Most individuals are referred to multiple
times in the records, although for reasons of space only one source is given; printed references in
the Preuves are always preferred if available, since they are easier to check. First names are abbre-
viated; unknown first names are indicated with a question mark. In a very few cases, where the
identification seemed sure, I have silently filled in a missing occupation using the notarial data-
base. I also include the four unnamed clergymen separately, as Millet does, although it is possible
that they are wholly or in part the same as some of the clergy listed by name. Jean des Aurieres
is listed in Ménard and Millet as Jean ‘‘des Fantaisies,’’ which was his nickname; it is possible that
Jean des Ollieres, listed separately here and by them, is really just a corrupt spelling of the same
person (especially since only Ménard’s text, not the source document, gives his occupation). The
two men of unknown occupation are included under ‘‘other’’ but not counted when calculating
the percentages.
overwhelming majority of officials were eventually released, while most
priests, once caught, were killed. As Millet has noted, many of these
were associated with the public performance of the Mass, including
(as mentioned earlier) Julien Corbon, hired for the choir. Millet infers
from the high death rate among priests that the primary goal of kill-
ing them was to silence the Mass in Nîmes forever. He therefore argues
that religion was a more important motive than politics in provoking
the massacre.52
Assessing human motivation is inevitably difficult, particularly in a
tumultuous event like the Michelade. Many people were involved in its
planning and execution, and there is no reason to believe that any one
of them participated for one single reason. Furthermore, religion and
politics were thoroughly intertwined in the sixteenth century. There is
plenty of evidence for both religious fervor and political passion among
the participants. One anonymous contemporary listed six motives for
the Michelade: (1) the wrong done to a female gardener, whose harvest
was stolen by members of the garrison; (2) the tyranny of the Catholics,
who had usurped the consulate; (3) the Protestant prince de Condé’s
national plan for Protestants to take up arms; (4) quarreling between
two leading families, the Catholic d’Albenas and the Protestant Cal-
vières, headed by Guillaume Calvière, the president of the présidial;
(5) the Protestants’ getting wind of a plan for a Catholic counterattack,
before 1567. On the occupational breakdown of Protestant victims, see Davis, ‘‘Rites of Violence,’’
177 (here she disagrees with Janine Garrisson-Estèbe); and Philip Benedict, Rouen during the Wars
of Religion (Cambridge, 1981), 76, 128.
52 Millet, ‘‘City Converted,’’ 184–87, 191–92, 207–8, 221–23.
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planned for the same time; and (6) the desire to avenge previous mas-
sacres of Protestants elsewhere in France.53 Several of these motives
have been discussed already; the first and fifth do not appear to be
substantiated by outside evidence, and the fourth is discussed below.
Several participants are also quoted in the depositions offering their
own explanations. Captain Bolhargues implied that the massacre was
a matter of revenge (the sixth reason), because ‘‘the papists did the
same thing throughout France.’’ Bernard Arnaud, one of the leading
Micheladeurs (he was in charge of guarding the Bocarié gate), put it dif-
ferently. He saw it as a question of survival: ‘‘Either [we] will be their
heirs, or the Catholics will be [ours].’’ Once Protestants knew that war
was coming anew, they must have viewed the Catholic elite as the poten-
tial nucleus of a fifth column, should Catholic forces threaten the town.
Similarly, Jean Vallat reported that he was menaced because he ‘‘sup-
ported those of [Catholic-controlled] Beaucaire, whom they called ene-
mies.’’ Both of these are rather secular, or political, interpretations of
the conflict. Some Catholics failed to see the logic of this position.
When Jean Rovyer was threatened by Protestant forces, who said to him
that they wanted to cut his throat and throw him down the well because
he was a papist, he replied that he ‘‘had not done wrong or displeased
anyone in the world.’’ Still, it is striking how many imprisoned Catholic
laypeople were released. Some Catholics may have been spared because
the Protestants hoped that they would be potential candidates for con-
version. Vidal Caintemesse was taken to hear a Protestant service and
then taken out to dinner at an inn and urged to sign up. Protestants
could also force Catholic laypeople to pay the many onerous expenses
of war. Vallat also reported that when people complained to the Mes-
sieurs about the impositions, they replied that ‘‘they had had too much
mercy in saving their lives, and they were papists and they wanted to
ruin them entirely.’’54
It seems clear that one cause of the Michelade was that the Protes-
53 Ménard 5, Notes sur l’histoire de Nîmes, 1–5, esp. 2.
54 Bolhargues is quoted in Ménard 5, Preuves, 25. The original reads, ‘‘l’on faisoit le sam-
blable par tout le royaume de France, pour aultant que les papistes avoient faict plusieurs massa-
cres contre ceulx de leur religion, volant dire des huguenots, a occasion desquels massacres l’on
avoit emeu sedition par tout le royaume de France.’’ Bernard Arnaud, seigneur de la Cassagne,
quote from ADG, G442, fol. 56: ‘‘Il fallot qu’ilz feussent leurs heretiers ou que les catholicques feus-
sent les leurs.’’ The Vallat quotations are from fols. 52, 60 and v: ‘‘il entretenoit ordinairement ceulx
de Beaucaire, qu’ilz appeloient ennemis,’’ and ‘‘lors que comme dessus a dit qu’il s’alloit plaindre
aud. Messieurs à lad. maison consulaire qu’ilz respondoent à pleuseurs catholicques s’allans plain-
dre à eulx qu’il leur auvoient faict trop de grace de leur avoir sauvé la vie, et qu’ils estoient papistes
et les voloent ryner entierement.’’ Rovyer quote is from fol. 90: they said, ‘‘luy voulloient le coup-
ple la gorge et getter dans le puys, pour ce qu’il estoit ung papiste. Sur quoy, il leur remonstra
qu’il n’avoit faict tort ny deplesir à personne du monde.’’
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tants of Nîmes felt deprived of what they saw as their right to rule.There
was a long history of conflict over the composition of the town council
in the years preceding the Michelade, which surely was a major cause of
frustration on the part of leading Protestants.55 Millet argues that the
massacre, which he sees as religious, should be distinguished from the
uprising, since the Protestants could have taken over the town without
bloodshed. But Protestant officials, especially officers of the présidial,
also resented the pretensions of the upstart Catholic consuls: the con-
suls de Gras and Rochette were also murdered. Furthermore, the Prot-
estant leadership deeply hated those Catholic officials who were not
killed: the punishing conditions of imprisonment were clearly aimed at
humiliating the victims.
The political and religious rivalry between the two confessions may
have turned personal, and leading Protestant families may have wished
to purge their Catholic rivals. As noted above, there was a rumor that
the Michelade began because a member of one leading Catholic family,
the d’Albenas, gave a member of a leading Protestant family, the Cal-
vières, a slap in the face.56 Guillaume Calvière was the president of the
présidial, and a member of the d’Albenas also served on the court: there
were few more eminent families in town.57 As part of my dissertation,
I analyzed the connections between the leading 249 families in Nîmes
(674 people), using the notarial records of 1550–62, and concluded
that there were six main factions among them. Thirteen people who
were killed, arrested, or molested in the Michelade were members of
these 249 elite families; seven of the thirteen (including the d’Albenas)
belonged to the most elite faction of all, consisting of fifty-six of Nîmes’s
richest and most powerful families, who were linked by marriage and
friendship. Indeed, the records suggest that the d’Albenas were by far
the most prominent Catholic family in town. In the notarial records, the
d’Albenas were connected to twenty-two other families, more than any
other family that remained Catholic at the time of the Michelade, and
55 Millet, ‘‘City Converted,’’ 191–92. Such conflict was hardly limited to Nîmes: for the case
of Castres, see Olivier Christin, La paix de religion: L’autonomisation de la raison politique au XVIe
siècle (Paris, 1997), 86, and more generally, for the conditions of coexistence in urban areas, see
chap. 3.
56 Pierre Rovyer reported a similar incident with different participants. He heard Pierre
Maltrait say to Guy de Rochette that Rochette ‘‘payeroit lors le soufflet qu’il luy avoit baillé’’ (ADG,
G442, fol. 70).
57 It is clear that the d’Albenas remained Catholic, since they appear repeatedly as god-
parents in AMN, UU1, Livre des batisés de le glise [sic] catedrale de nostre dame de nismes depuis le moys
d’aoust 1568. It should be noted that one leading member of the d’Albenas family, Jean-Poldo
d’Albenas, author of the first description of Nîmes’s antiquities, appears to have flirted with Prot-
estantism before returning to the Catholic fold. He probably died in 1566. On him, see Puech,
‘‘Débuts de la Réforme à Nîmes,’’ 196.
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they were also the wealthiest Catholic family. Of the twenty-two families
connected with the d’Albenas, twelve converted to Protestantism before
the Michelade, eight remained Catholic, and two are unknown. For
comparison, the des Georges family was connected to six families, all of
whom converted, and of the three families connected to the Gregoires,
two converted and one remained Catholic. Since the des Georges and
the Gregoires were members of consular rather than judicial families,
it is not surprising that they were connected to fewer families than the
d’Albenas, but even the Richiers and the Valletes, also members of the
présidial, were connected only to eight and fourteen families, respec-
tively. Of the thirteen elite victims in the Michelade, six (including
Bernard Poldo d’Albenas) were members of families that were tied to
the d’Albenas family. Victims in this group included members of the
d’Albenas, Richier, Roverie, and Vallete families. The d’Albenas were
close to the Richier and Vallete families, as one would expect, since
all three were associated with the présidial; given their prominence in
Catholic circles, it is also no surprise that the d’Albenas were close to
Jean Paberan, the bishop’s deputy, who was killed.58 The evidence thus
suggests that the d’Albenas were at the center of a complex of families
that included the most elite Catholics in Nîmes and that constituted
just under half of the victims of the Michelade who were members of
the 249 elite families. Although there is little direct evidence of antago-
nism between the d’Albenas and Calvière families, it does appear that
they headed opposing religious factions on the présidial, and certainly
a high percentage of Catholic présidial members were arrested in the
Michelade. There is no other evidence for a d’Albenas slapping a Cal-
vière in the face, but that they disliked each other is plausible, although
before the Reformation ties existed between them. Perhaps these ties
explain why only one of the Catholic members of the présidial was killed,
in addition to the advantages they had owing to their wealth.59
58 The seven killed were Honoré Richier, Jacques Barrière, Jean and Bauzille de Roverie,
Pierre Saurin, Pierre Vallete, and d’Albenas. All of their families had ties to the d’Albenas except
Barrière and Saurin. For definitions of elite and an explanation of how the analysis was done, see
Tulchin, ‘‘Reformation in Nîmes,’’ 356–61 (table of factions, 357), and appendix, 395–429. For
some examples of the kind of ties I am referring to, when Pierre Vallete married, Jean, Jacques,
and Galhard d’Albenas were all among the witnesses (ADG, IIE1, vol. 233, fol. 196 [Sept. 18, 1551]).
When Catherine d’Albenas married, Paberan was among the witnesses (ADG, IIE1, vol. 234, fol.
119 [ July 19, 1552]).
59 It should be borne in mind that the notarial database covers 1550–62, before the impact
of the Reformation was felt among the elite. In that era, the elite was fairly unified, and preexist-
ing factional lines do not appear to have had any effect on religious choices. Somewhat more
surprisingly, the ties between the d’Albenas and the Calvières persisted right to the end of the
period, even when one might think that religious divisions might have started to matter: when
Pierre d’Albenas was married, Guillaume Calvière was one of the witnesses (ADG, IIE1, vol. 251,
fol. 281v [Feb. 21, 1562 old style, 1563 new style]).
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As noted earlier, Protestants everywhere had a horror of the
Catholic clergy. The Protestant leaders behind the Michelade may also
have felt that Catholic priests were particularly dangerous because they
were the backbone of the opposition. The Catholic clerical and lay
leadership worked hand in glove in the period 1564–67, and it is cer-
tainly reasonable to suppose that the initiative came from the clergy.
Why else were its legal representatives so often subsequently chosen
first consul? In short, although it is certainly true that Protestant dis-
taste for Catholicism was fixated more on the clergy and the Mass than
on the Catholic political elite, the extreme frustrations that led to the
Michelade might have been caused by political as well as religious fac-
tors. The Catholic church in Nîmes could hardly have taken the course
it did without political support, and, indeed, religion and politics had
been jumbled together since the beginning of the Reformation. It is
possible that, with more adroit policies, the Catholic party could have
avoided the provocations that led to the Michelade. But Catholic con-
trol of the council did make an uprising extremely likely, not least
because it would have been well-nigh impossible for the Catholic party
to resist making the decisions it did. Reinstating Catholic ceremonies
had been about, among other things, asserting their dominance. The
Protestant response was violent, ugly, and direct: as several Protestants
were reported to have said, Catholics were ‘‘papist vermin.’’60
Conclusion
Davis’s interpretation cautiously endorses the Calvinist Histoire ecclésias-
tique, whose authors wrote that ‘‘those of the Reformed Religion made
war only on images and altars, which do not bleed, while those of the
Roman religion spilled blood with every kind of cruelty.’’61 According
to the standard interpretation, Protestants shed less blood because they
did not believe that heretics were social pollutants. If this were true,
then when Protestants had the power to kill Catholics, they would not
have done so. Nîmes suggests that was not the case: in two incidents
only two years apart, Protestants probably killed more than two hun-
dred people—a remarkably high number, given Nîmes’s population.
This record makes one shudder to contemplate what Protestant parties
might have done elsewhere had they enjoyed the strength they did in
Nîmes. Indeed, the events of the Michelade are disturbingly similar to a
massacre committed by the Protestant majority in La Rochelle in 1568.
60 ADG, G442, fol. 61.
61 Cited in Davis, ‘‘Rites of Violence,’’ 173.
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Many parallels could also be drawn to Catholic massacres, including
that of Troyes in 1572, in which troops again arrested and then mur-
dered people, although in Nîmes there was more popular participation:
in Troyes the men who arrested and murdered the Protestants were few
and mostly professionals, members of the town militia. Protestant and
Catholic massacres were more similar than different, probably because
they stemmed from similar anxieties.62 Protestants elsewhere may have
focused their attacks on statues because vandalism can be done at
night, with few or no witnesses. A riot against real people requires a
superiority of force that sixteenth-century French Protestants rarely
possessed. Nîmes was one of the few exceptions. The Michelade sug-
gests that there are two essential preconditions for mass murder: an
overwhelming superiority of force and a fear that the weaker party
nonetheless poses an existential threat to the stronger one.
While the Michelade shows that Protestants could be just as vio-
lent as Catholics in sixteenth-century France, it would be a mistake
to throw out all of the insights of previous scholars. Protestant anger
in Nîmes was especially directed at priests and leading political oppo-
nents. The evidence of those murdered in the Michelade thus sup-
ports one of Crouzet’s major conclusions, namely, that priests and the
‘‘enemy army-rabble’’ were the principal targets of Protestant violence.
It should be borne in mind, however, that only one-third of the victims
can be identified, and that if the list were complete, the percentage of
ordinary Catholics would surely be higher. Even without a complete
list, given the numbers of people who died, it seems excessively kind
of Crouzet to call Protestant violence ‘‘optimistic’’ and to suggest that
Protestants pursued their aims ‘‘without breaking bodies and without
torturing flesh.’’ If Protestant rage was more narrowly focused than its
Catholic equivalent, Protestants were nevertheless quite as capable of
mass murder as Catholics when circumstances permitted it. Further-
more, Crouzet contends that Protestants limited their targets because
it supports his thesis that (killing priests aside) Protestant violence was
more ‘‘rational.’’ It was designed merely to restrain Catholic attacks and
to preserve the Protestants’ ability to proselytize, whereas the Catho-
lics’ burning desire to extirpate heretics led them to kill Protestants
indiscriminately.63 Crouzet insists that Protestant violence was ratio-
nal as part of a larger argument that Protestantism was a modern-
izing force. But the Michelade does not support this. When Crouzet
62 Kevin C. Robbins, City on the Ocean Sea, La Rochelle, 1530–1650: Urban Society, Religion, and
Politics on the French Atlantic Frontier (Leiden, 1997), 201–4; and Roberts, City in Conflict, 145–49. In
Troyes, the bodies were then dumped in a ditch.
63 Crouzet, Guerriers de dieu, 1:616.
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emphasizes cool rationality, he downplays the fury of Protestants stuff-
ing bloody bodies down the well at the bishop of Nîmes’s palace.64 When
the Protestants conveyed their victims to the room traditionally used
as a Lenten abattoir, they demonstrated their hatred and contempt.
Catholic crowds elsewhere, who flushed Protestant corpses down the
sewers, may have been sending a similar message as much as enacting
a rite of purification.
Beyond comparing Protestant and Catholic styles of violence, in
‘‘The Rites of Violence’’ Davis was making a broader point that is now
widely accepted, namely, that historians need to consider what crowds
meant by their actions, rather than dismiss them as irrational. For her
argument, one of the prime examples is that sixteenth-century crowds
held mock trials of their victims, as Catholics in Montpellier did in 1569,
to proclaim the justice of their cause. But as Davis implies, we need to
consider not just the message but also the audience. Explaining this
mock judicial conduct, she comments that ‘‘when the magistrate had
not used his sword to defend the faith and the true church and to pun-
ish the idolaters, then the crowd would do it for him.’’65 In other words,
the crowd was sending a message to the authorities, appealing to and
rebuking them at the same time. Unlike in Montpellier, in the case of
the Michelade the participants appear to have intended to deliver their
message not to the authorities but to their opponents. They were pro-
claiming their views not to posterity, or to future historians, but to spe-
cific people whom they probably knew well. When we attempt to read
the meaning of a sixteenth-century crowd’s actions, we should bear in
mind that we are eavesdropping. Understanding their meaning thus
requires integrating social analysis with the analysis of discourse; unless
we know something about the players, we will miss part of the conversa-
tion. Once we recognize that people engaged in murderous uprisings
like the Michelade and other forms of religious riot were interested
in sending messages to specific opponents and potential supporters, it
becomes understandable that, in many respects, the two groups used
a common language and largely similar symbolism. Religious violence
was a form of communication, where the differing parties had different
messages but used a common medium to communicate them. In Nîmes,
Protestants demonstrated their hatred and contempt of Catholicism by
their treatment of the elite and the clergy, but ordinary Catholics could
hardly have avoided getting the message.
64 Mark Greengrass, ‘‘The Anatomy of a Religious Riot in Toulouse in May 1562,’’ Journal
of Ecclesiastical History 34 (1983): 389, is also hesitant to explain violence in ritual terms without
considering other factors.
65 Davis, ‘‘Rites of Violence,’’ 161 (quotation), 178–79 (purification rites).
